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Abstract—The battle to mitigate Android malware has become 
more critical with the emergence of new strains incorporating 
increasingly sophisticated evasion techniques, in turn 
necessitating more advanced detection capabilities. Hence, in this 
paper we propose and evaluate a machine learning based 
approach based on eigenspace analysis for Android malware 
detection using features derived from static analysis 
characterization of Android applications. Empirical evaluation 
with a dataset of real malware and benign samples show that 
detection rate of over 96% with a very low false positive rate is 
achievable using the proposed method.   
Keywords—malware detection; statistical machine learning; 
Android; eigenvectors; eigenspace; mobile security;  
I. INTRODUCTION  
Mobile malware has become an issue of increasing concern, 
particularly on the Android platform which has been targeted 
relentlessly in recent years. In contrast to other mobile 
platforms, Android allows installation of apps from third-party 
markets and other unverified sources making it more susceptible 
to malware. The exponential growth in Android devices and the 
buoyant and largely unregulated app market produced a sharp 
rise in malware targeting the platform. In 2013, an estimated 
1000 new Android malware samples were discovered every day; 
in 2014 the number has risen to 2000 malware samples seen 
daily [1].  
Since their debut in mid-2010, Android malware have 
evolved beyond simple information stealing programs to more 
sophisticated malicious software employing various obfuscation 
techniques and detection avoidance capabilities. For example, 
sophisticated Android malware families are employing payload 
encryption, obfuscated command and control channels, runtime 
dynamic loading of malicious payload, etc. which makes 
detection and analysis more challenging. 
Another major problem is the difficulty of spotting malware 
in the wild, given that many app sources exist and thousands of 
apps are uploaded every day. Traditional scanners that rely on 
malware signatures are not effective at detecting new malware 
for which they have no existing signature in their database. 
Hence, new techniques to enable timely and proactive discovery 
of unknown Android malware are definitely required.  
Hence, in this paper, we propose and evaluate an Android 
malware detection scheme based on the face recognition 
technique known as eigenfaces [2]. The eigenfaces method 
measures the extent of similarities and differences amongst a set 
of faces in a database. It is based on the premise that every face 
is a linear combination of the basic set of faces called eigenfaces. 
The eigenfaces are projections of real faces into an eigenspace 
which is defined by the vectors that spans across significant 
variations amongst them. In this paper, these basic principles are 
applied to develop an eigenspace model based on static analysis 
characterization of applications which is then used to determine 
whether or not a given new application is potentially malicious.   
In the next section related work in Android malware 
detection will be discussed; next, the approach proposed in this 
paper will be detailed, then the experimental studies undertaken 
to evaluate the effectiveness of the scheme will be presented, 
followed by analysis of the results, conclusions and future work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
In this section, an overview of related prior works in Android 
malware detection that are based on static analysis and machine 
learning is presented. Static analysis is a method of scrutinizing 
an application without execution, in order to uncover potentially 
malicious behaviour. It underpins the approach proposed in this 
paper. Several works have utilized static analysis for Android 
malware detection. Some of these proposals are based on 
heuristics or manually crafted rules for example [3] and [4]. 
Others have been designed to detect vulnerabilities e.g. 
Comdroid [5] and DroidChecker [6].   
Recently, several other efforts have combined static analysis 
with machine learning for Android malware detection. For 
example, DroidMat is proposed in [7] as a static feature-based 
system that applies K-means algorithm for enhanced modelling 
and the kNN algorithm to classify applications as benign or 
malicious. The DroidMat system used features based on 
requested permissions, Intents, and API call tracing for each app 
component. The authors compare their system to the 
Androguard malware analysis tool using 1738 sample 
applications.  
In [8] a Bayesian classification model is developed using 
static analysis based on 58 features derived from API calls, 
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intents, and system commands to classify Android applications 
as ‘benign’ or ‘suspicious’. This model was further analysed in 
[9] to study the impact of using features derived from 
permissions alongside API calls, intents and system commands 
for Bayesian-based detection of Android malware. Peng et. al. 
[10] also proposed and evaluated probabilistic generative 
models based on Android permissions features; while Sanz et. 
al. [11] trained and compared several machine learning 
algorithms employing Android permissions features in order to 
detect malware. X. Liu and J. Liu [12] proposed a two layer 
system based on permission features that classify applications in 
three stages, with each stage utilizing the J48 Decision Tree 
algorithm to determine whether an application is suspicious or 
benign. Sahs and Khan [13] utilized call flow graphs to train a 
one-class SVM machine learning algorithm for detection of 
Android malware, while Arp et. al.  [14] proposed DREBIN 
which also employed SVM and performs a broad static analysis 
to gather as many features of an application as possible for 
device-based detection of suspicious apps.  
Other recent efforts include: Sharma and Dash [15] where 
models based on API calls and requested permissions were built 
and investigated using Naïve Bayes and K-Nearest Neighbour 
classifiers. Yerima et. al. [16], investigated parallel classifiers 
that utilized static features based on permissions, system 
commands and API calls. The paper compared various parallel 
classification combination schemes aimed at improving 
detection accuracy over single classification algorithms. Unlike 
[7]-[16] however, Kang et. al. [17] did not use features from 
decompiled or disassembled code but rather utilized Dalvik 
bytecode frequency analysis extracted from 1300 malware 
samples and classified the malware into their 26 respective 
families using the Random Forest machine learning algorithm.  
Different from all the aforementioned existing works, this 
paper proposes and evaluates an eigenspace approach for 
Android malware detection. Earlier work employing related 
approaches for malware detection were investigated for 
Windows-based metamorphic worms by Saleh [18] and 
Deshpande [19]. A different approach is developed in this paper 
for Android malware detection using the same basic principles. 
III. EIGENSPACE APPROACH FOR ANDROID MALWARE 
DETECTION 
A set of input features are required to characterize the 
applications when using the eigenspace approach. The features 
chosen to characterize the applications are motivated by the 
manner in which malware typically misuse certain API calls, 
permissions, and intents for malicious activities, and how they 
attempt to illegitimately run system commands for privilege 
escalation. The features are extracted from static analysis of the 
APKs in order to characterize each application according to their 
usage of these features. 
A. Applications characterization 
The features extracted from the applications for 
characterization and input into the eigenspace analysis based 
system consists of: API related features, permissions related 
features, intents, and commands related features. Previous 
works such as [7]-[12] and [14]-[16] have found these type of 
static features to be effective for training machine learning 
models for classification. Hence, we are similarly motivated to 
utilize features derived from these categories to develop the 
eigenspace based detection models proposed in this paper. 
The API related features are obtained by mining the 
disassembled Dalvik executable (dex) file. These include API 
calls for accessing subscriber identity, device identity, executing 
external commands, intercepting broadcast notifications, 
encryption, etc. Indeed, most mobile malware attempt to steal 
sensitive information or send premium SMS messages by taking 
advantage of standard platform APIs [20]. It is therefore 
conceivable to include features related to such API calls in our 
feature set. 
The permissions related features are keywords that map onto 
standard Android permissions which an app requests by 
declaring them in the manifest file. As observed previously, (e.g. 
[9], [11], and [12]) certain permissions are requested more 
frequently by malware than others. For example, ‘risky’ 
permissions that request ability to read contacts, read SMS 
messages, send SMS messages, install packages, delete 
packages, access location information, etc. are commonly found 
to be declared in manifest files of packages containing malware.  
Intents are used for intra-process and inter-process 
communication on Android. They are passive data structures 
exchanged as asynchronous messages allowing information 
about events to be shared between different applications and 
different components of applications. For example, malware 
commonly listen for the BOOT_COMPLETED intent in order 
to trigger malicious activity immediately on booting a device.  
Commands related features are keywords that detect the 
presence of system commands like ‘chown’, ‘chmod’, ‘mount’ 
etc. or certain parameters which may be used with these 
commands. In many malicious APKs, these commands can be 
found embedded in hidden files within an APK and invoked to 
enable privilege escalation, launch concealed scripts, remove 
traces of malicious activities, install additional malicious 
components, etc. The features used for characterizing 
applications for the eigenspace scheme developed in this paper 
can be found in the appendix. 
B. Model development 
The goal is to apply the eigenspace approach to recognize 
whether a given unknown Android application is potentially 
malicious or not based on how close it is determined to be 
similar to a known application in the dataset and then assign it 
to the same class as the known application. A set of malware and 
benign applications are used to create an eigenspace for 
detecting new/unknown malware. 
The training sets were constructed as follows: 
1. Create a training set S consisting of M malware and B 
benign applications. Denote S ={S1, S2, ..., SK} where 
K = M + B 
2. Let N be the number of features characterizing each 
application in set S. Each application is represented by 
its features in an N × 1 column vector V  where     V T  
= [f1, f2 . . . fN]   and {0,1} for 1...if i N   
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3. Arrange all the individual column vectors into an N × 
K matrix Φ = [V1, V2, . . . , VK] 
4. Compute ε, the column vector representing the mean 
features of the set of the training applications 
represented in Φ as follows: 
1
1
V
K
nnK


                           (1) 
5. Obtain the matrix A = [V′1, V′2, ..., V′K]  where          V′i 
= Vi – ε,   for i = 1 ... k 
6. Next, find the eigenvectors γ of the covariance matrix 
C, where C = AAT. Note that C is an N × N matrix, and 
since N ≪ K given the number of applications to be 
incorporated into the training set is larger than the 
number of features, the eigenvectors are computed 
directly from C. 
7. Suppose γi is a eigenvector of C then  
                                     C γi = λ iγi                          (2) 
 where λ i is the corresponding eigenvalue. 
8. Thus the set of eigenvectors γ = { γ1 , γ2 , …, γN’ } are 
computed and sorted in descending order of 
magnitude of their corresponding eigenvalues with 
those having higher values being more important in 
describing the applications. Hence, a number of N′ 
eigenvectors are chosen to describe the eigenspace 
(i.e. the linear space spanned by the selected 
eigenvectors). 
9. Each sample in the training set S is projected into the 
eigenspace defined by these eigenvectors by 
representing each one as a linear combination of 
eigenvectors and weights. 
                    
'
1
'
N
j ji
j
V w 

 ,    where N′ ≤ N         (3) 
10. The weights of each application in the training set can 
be calculated from 
                      
T
, 1, 2, ..., ''j j i j Nw V                (4) 
11. The weights of the application can be combined into 
a vector W,  where   W T = [w1, w2, …., wN’] 
12. Let  D = [W1,W2, …., WK] 
13. D can be considered a model trained from the K 
samples in S which consists of applications from both 
malware and benign classes.  
C. Classifying a new application: 
In order to classify a new application, its defining features 
(f1, f2 . . . fN) are first extracted and steps 4 and 5 above are used 
to subtract the mean (training set) application. Thus we obtain 
V′new = Vnew – ε where Vnew  is the column vector of its defining 
features.  
Next, we project V′new   into the eigenspace defined by the set 
of eigenvectors γ1 , γ2 , …, γN’  to obtain its weight vector: 
WnewT = [w1, w2… wN’]   where    
T
, 1, 2, ..., ''j j new j Nw V   
Hence, to determine how much the new application is close 
to an application in the training set with weight vector Wi, the 
Euclidean distance between the weight vectors are calculated to 
yield a score given by: 
Score = ||W-Wi || =
 2 2 21 1 2 2 ' '( ) ( ) ... ( )N Nw w w                  (5) 
By scoring the new application against each application in 
the training set S represented by their respective weight vectors 
in D, we can predict the class of the application by: 
P = arg mini ||W-Wi ||,    i = 1 ... K                (6) 
If P belongs in the (labelled) malware class then the new 
application is predicted to be malicious otherwise it is predicted 
to be benign. 
IV. METHODOLOGY AND EXPERIMENTS 
This section describes the methodology of the experiments 
that were conducted to evaluate the Android malware detection 
approach proposed in this paper. 
A. Dataset pre-processing 
The experiments were undertaken using 6,860 applications; 
of these, 2,925 were malware while the remaining 3,935 were 
benign applications. The samples were provided by McAfee 
(part of Intel Security). In order to extract the defining features 
from the applications, a bespoke Android package analysis tool  
was developed using Java and python. The tool enables 
automated reverse engineering of Android applications to allow 
for the construction of feature vectors which are subsequently 
arranged into a matrix of column vectors characterizing each 
application as explained in the previous section.   
Initially, 175 features based on API calls, permissions, 
intents and commands related keywords were extracted for each 
of the applications. The features were ranked in order of 
relevance using the Gain Ratio criterion in WEKA [21]. 
Subsequently, 100 top ranked features were selected for training 
the eigenspace model. The 100 features are given in the 
appendix in their ranking order. Thus, according to our model, 
we have N = 100. This pre-processing stage resulted in a 100 × 
6860 matrix of feature vectors that were  further processed using 
various python scripts and MATLAB in order to build the 
eigenspace model as described in section III.  
B. Model training phase 
The experiments were conducted using a 5-fold cross 
validation approach with 80% of the dataset used for training 
and 20% for testing. Thus, each time, a different testing set was 
used against a complementary trained eigenspace model 
consisting of 80% of the dataset and the results were averaged. 
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A training set consisted of feature vectors from 2340 malware 
and 3151 benign applications, giving an input matrix Φ of 
dimension 100 × 5491 for the model.  ε was calculated and 
subtracted to obtain matrix A of the same dimension. The set of 
eigenvectors and eigenvalues were computed as described in 
section III, and then the top 70 eigenvectors (out of 100) 
covering 95% variance were selected to construct the 
eigenspace. Thus, N′=70 with the eigenspace dimension reduced 
to 70 × 100 from the initial 100 × 100 matrix. Next, the weight 
vectors W are calculated by projecting each training feature 
vector (from A) into the eigenspace defined by the N′ 
eigenvectors. Finally, a matrix D is produced from the operation 
to yield a trained model against which the testing set is 
evaluated. 
C. Testing and classification phase 
The test set for each of the 5 folds consisted of 585 malware 
samples and 787 benign samples (20% of the dataset). For each 
test set, the weight vectors W were computed against the 
corresponding training set’s eigenvectors. During the testing 
phase, each test application was measured against each app in 
the training set using the Euclidean distances (of their 
projections into eigenspace represented by the weight vectors W 
) to derive a score for each app in the training set. The class of 
the test app is predicted by assigning it to the class of the app 
that returns the minimum score in the training set. The app that 
returns the minimum score is considered to be the one that is 
(functionally) most similar to the test app from amongst the 
training set.  In our experiments performed on a 64 bit Windows 
7 system with an Intel Xeon 2.27 GHz CPU and 16GB RAM, 
the classification took between 2.1 to 2.2 seconds for each app 
in the testing set. 
Since there are two classes to be predicted, the matrix D of 
the trained model, was arranged to have the weight vectors of 
the malware samples preceding those of the benign samples. 
Thus W1,W2, …., W2340 were malware vectors while W2341,W2342, 
…., W5491 represented benign weight vectors. Hence, 2340 was 
the decision threshold for determining whether a given test 
application was benign or malware. The test apps that returned 
a minimum score corresponding to an app labelled equal to or 
below 2340 were predicted to be malware. While those that 
returned a minimum score corresponding to an app labelled 
above 2340 were predicted to be benign. Hence, the 
classification criteria for a given new application Snew are stated 
as follows: 
If  P=arg  mini ||W-Wi ||  ≤ 2340 Then Snew is Suspicious 
If  P=arg  mini ||W-Wi ||  > 2340 Then Snew is Benign 
Measurements of prediction accuracy were taken during 
each run of the experiment and averaged to obtain the overall 
results. The results are presented and discussed in the next 
section. 
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
In this section, the results of the experiments undertaken to 
evaluate the model are presented. Figure 1 depicts a mapping of 
test samples to training samples during one run of the 
experiments. This gives a visualization of the prediction 
accuracy at a glance.  The x-axis is the test sample number while 
the y-axis is the training sample number. The dots represent an 
intersection of test and training sample pair that are closest in the 
eigenspace. The lines demarcate the labelled malicious samples 
from the benign ones; hence, the quadrants with the dense points 
correspond to correctly predicted classes while the two 
quadrants with the sparse fewer points denote the incorrectly 
predicted classes (i.e. false positives and false negatives). This 
illustrates that the eigenspace approach was quite effective at 
guessing the class of the test samples with only very few false 
positives and false negatives. Also, since only the weights are 
used, the determination of the class is quite fast during the 
testing phase, i.e. 2.1-2.2 seconds as mentioned earlier. 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Depiction of classification accuracy and error at a glance: Mapping 
test samples to training samples via the eigenspace method. Testing samples 
class (suspicious/benign) threshold is 585. Training samples class 
(suspicious/benign) threshold is 2340. 
 
Table I presents the average accuracy measurements 
obtained in the evaluation of the eigenspace approach. Here, the 
TPR (True positive ratio) i.e. ratio of correctly classified 
malware to the total malware apps; TNR (True negative ratio) 
i.e. ratio of correctly classified benign apps to the total benign 
apps; FNR (False positive ratio) i.e. incorrectly classified 
malware; FPR (false positive ratio) i.e. incorrectly classified 
benign apps; overall accuracy (ACC) and error (ERR) are 
shown.  
The table shows that 96.3% of the malware apps were 
correctly classified i.e. only 3.7% of the malware were false 
negatives. Also, 96.5% of the benign apps were correctly 
classified by the eigenspace approach, with only 3.6% recorded 
as false positives.  
TABLE I. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE EIGENSPACE SPACE APPROACH 
VS. OTHER CLASSIFICATION METHODS 
 TPR FPR TNR FNR ACC ERR 
Eigenspace 0.963 0.035 0.965 0.037 0.964 0.036 
NB 0.772 0.087 0.913 0.228 0.843 0.158 
DT 0.945 0.040 0.960 0.055 0.953 0.048 
SL 0.901 0.049 0.951 0.099 0.926 0.074 
PART 0.953 0.041 0.959 0.047 0.956 0.044 
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These results demonstrates that the proposed eigenspace 
approach is very effective for Android malware detection and is 
also able to classify the apps with improved classification 
accuracy compared to other popular machine learning 
techniques as seen from Table I. Using the same dataset and 5-
fold cross validation approach, results from the Naïve Bayes 
(NB), Decision Tree (DT), Simple Logistic (SL) and PART 
learning algorithms were obtained for comparison to the 
eigenspace approach. Figures 2, 3 and 4 present a graphical 
depiction of the comparative results in the table. 
 
Fig. 2. TPR comparison of eigenspace approach with NB, SL, PART and 
DT machine learning algorithms. 
 
Fig. 3. TNR comparison of eigenspace approach with NB, SL, PART and 
DT machine learning algorithms. 
 
 
Fig. 4. ACC comparison of eigenspace approach with NB, SL, PART and 
DT machine learning algorithms. 
From figure 2, it can be seen that the eigenspace approach 
was able to predict more malware samples accurately than the 
other four learning algorithms. Figure 3 also showed that the 
eigenspace approach was able to guess more of the benign 
samples correctly than the other four algorithms. The overall 
accuracy depicted in Figure 4 shows that despite how well the 
DT and PART algorithms work for the given features that have 
been used, the eigenspace method still surpassed them in overall 
prediction accuracy. Thus, we can also conclude that the 
particular set of static features used are well suited to building 
eigenspace models that can perform very well in predicting and 
classifying Android apps. 
A. Discussions 
Decision Trees classification algorithms are known to 
perform very well on many datasets. For the experiments in this 
paper we used the WEKA implementations of the J48 decision 
tree algorithm. PART is a rule based approach that uses partial 
decision trees for rule induction; hence it is not surprising that 
that PART also shows a good accuracy performance like the DT. 
The eigenspace approach does better than either one of them, 
and in practice can be quite computationally cost effective in 
classification of new samples, especially when a streamlined 
training set is used with pre-computed Euclidean distances 
utilized for the ‘minimum score’ calculation.   
Since the eigenspace approach attempts to determine the 
class by finding the closest or most similar app in the training 
dataset, it could potentially enable a more straightforward 
determination of the family a new app might belong to or an 
indication of what functionalities might be present, than the 
other machine learning methods. For instance, referring back to 
Figure 1, assuming that the families of the training samples on 
the y-axis and their functionalities are known, the mapping of 
the test sample to a training sample could be used to approximate 
the malware family or estimate possible functionalities 
(depending on the magnitude of the minimum score). In the 
same vein, another potential advantage compared to the other 
machine learning techniques is the possibility to infer significant 
differences in functionality of newly detected malware from 
existing families. Furthermore, eigenspace models can readily 
be improved over time by a self-improving mechanism that can 
automatically eliminate false positive clusters from the training 
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set or include new true negative samples into the training set (to 
further enrich the eigenspace). This possibility to dynamically 
control the FPR and TNR in this manner is another advantage of 
the eigenspace approach over other machine learning methods. 
The ease which the model can be incrementally trained/re-
trained to improve accuracy by including novel training samples 
makes it an attractive machine learning based classification 
technique for detecting new Android malware in practice.  
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presented an effective eigenspace analysis 
approach to Android malware detection. The proposed approach 
is investigated using 2,925 real malware samples and 3,935 
clean samples employing standard cross-validation method. The 
eigenspace approach is based on the eigenfaces technique which 
has its origins in face recognition applications. The results 
obtained from extensive empirical evaluations show that it is a 
promising scheme for Android malware detection with 96.4% 
accuracy and only 3.6% false positives observed. We have also 
found that compared to several popular machine learning 
techniques the eigenspace approach performs quite well and at 
the same time can enable better usability in practical systems. 
Moreover, it is easily applicable in many scenarios where 
inference of other additional knowledge such as related malware 
families may be useful. 
The model proposed in this paper can be improved further. 
Hence, future work will investigate means of reducing detection 
errors, such as applying more effective filters at the feature 
extraction phase to improve the application characterization, or 
deriving and experimenting with different sets of features which 
could be more discriminative for classification. Another aspect 
for further investigation is streamlining and optimizing the 
eigenspace whilst still retaining high accuracy performance. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE II.       100 TOP GAIN RATIO RANKED FEATURES USED FOR THE EIGENSPACE BASED ANDROID MALWARE DETECTION MODEL. 
Feature Type Feature Type 
SEND SMS  P BROADCAST SMS  P 
createSubprocess API KILL BACKGROUND PROCESSES  P 
remount CR READ SYNC STATS  P 
/system/bin/sh CR CAMERA  P 
chown CR  res CR 
RECEIVE SMS  P KeySpec API 
/system/app CR DELETE PACKAGES  P 
abortBroadcast API MODIFY PHONE STATE  P 
pm install CR Ljavax crypto Cipher API 
READ SMS  P WRITE CONTACTS  P 
WRITE SMS  P BIND INPUT METHOD  P 
mount CR PROCESS OUTGOING CALLS  P 
FACTORY TEST  P SET WALLPAPER HINTS  P 
WRITE APN SETTINGS  P READ LOGS  P 
RESTART PACKAGES  P CALL PHONE  P 
CHANGE COMPONENT ENABLED STATE  P INTERNAL SYSTEM WINDOW  P 
getSubscriberId API BLUETOOTH ADMIN  P 
BIND REMOTEVIEWS  P CHANGE WIFI MULTICAST STATE  P 
DISABLE KEYGUARD  P UPDATE DEVICE STATS  P 
CHANGE WIFI STATE  P RECEIVE BOOT COMPLETED  P 
CLEAR APP CACHE  P SecretKey API 
READ PHONE STATE  P getLine1Number API 
TelephonyManager API BLUETOOTH  P 
FindClass API DEVICE POWER  P 
AUTHENTICATE ACCOUNTS  P READ EXTERNAL STORAGE  P 
chmod CR BROADCAST WAP PUSH  P 
BIND WALLPAPER  P FLASHLIGHT  P 
BIND ACCESSIBILITY SERVICE  P HARDWARE TEST  P 
DELETE CACHE FILES  P WRITE SECURE SETTINGS  P 
GET PACKAGE SIZE  P Runtime API 
READ CALL LOG  P INTERNET  P 
INSTALL PACKAGES  P READ CONTACTS  P 
GET ACCOUNTS  P RECORD AUDIO  P 
SMSReceiver API Intent.action.RUN intent 
Ljava net URLDecoder API REBOOT  P 
intent.action.BOOT COMPLETED Intent ACCESS LOCATION EXTRA CS  P 
GLOBAL SEARCH  P READ HISTORY BOOKMARKS  P 
MANAGE ACCOUNTS  P getNetworkOperator API 
ACCESS NETWORK STATE  P EXPAND STATUS BAR  P 
SET ORIENTATION  P jar CR 
/system/bin CR DexClassLoader API 
USE CREDENTIALS  P WRITE HISTORY BOOKMARKS  P 
RECEIVE WAP PUSH  P CHANGE NETWORK STATE  P 
bindService API getDeviceId API 
NFC  P STATUS BAR  P 
RECEIVE MMS  P SET WALLPAPER  P 
BIND APPWIDGET  P HttpGet init API 
Ljavax crypto spec SecretKeySpec API getPackageManager API 
exec API getCallState API 
getSimSerialNumber API apk CR 
 
P: permission 
CR: Command related 
API: API call related 
